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Abstract: Amongst the most serious objections to Kierkegaard’s ethics in Works of 
Love (1847) is that it does not seek to change temporal socio-economic or political 
conditions; on these matters, it is alleged, Kierkegaard’s thought is apathetic. After 
first discussing Jamie Ferreira’s widely accepted answer to this charge, this article 
further problematises the issue. Rather than downplaying the implications of 
Kierkegaard’s claims, in what follows I set the vision of Works of Love’s ethics 
against the intertextual backdrop of Kierkegaard’s thought on the individual’s 
relatedness to God, and the nature of the love which God mandates towards others. 
The linchpin of both these strands of thought is the figure of Jesus Christ: the self-
revelation of God and “the prototype” for humanity. The result of this, I argue, is to 
heighten the potentially objectionable nature of Kierkegaard’s remarks.  
The Accusation of Otherworldliness in Works of Love  
The charge of otherworldliness against Kierkegaard’s 1847 Works of Love (WOL) 
commonly centres upon a much-discussed passage at the beginning of WOL’s 
discourse “IIIB: Love is a Matter of Conscience.” In this passage, Kierkegaard points 
towards the economically disadvantaged within society, epitomized by his figure of 
a “poor, wretched charwoman,” and argues that what Christianity advises is for 
every person (including the charwoman) not to “worry” or busy themselves [travlt] 
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about changing their socio-economic conditions so as to achieve a higher social 
status.  The change in referent which occurs within Christianity from the temporal 1
to one’s relationship to the eternal/God means that “in inwardness everything is 
changed,” while externally all remains the same.  Indeed, Kierkegaard comments 2
that although people have “foolishly busied [travlt] themselves in the name of 
Christianity” to show that men and women should be socially and economically 
equal, Christianity has never even “desired” such equality.  It is on the basis of 3
these provocative comments that Kierkegaard has been read as an apathetic 
thinker, economically naïve at best, and a “disingenuous advocate” for the 
bourgeois class of his time at worst.  4
Ferreira’s Defence of Kierkegaard 
Among the most persuasive attempts to rescue Kierkegaard from these 
readings is that of Jamie Ferreira. In her commentary on WOL, Ferreira argues that 
Kierkegaard’s apparent dismissal of socio-economic conditions is not intended to 
promote an attitude of apathy, but to ensure that there can be no grounds for 
excluding anyone from the commandment to love your neighbor.  In support of this, 5
 Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson 1
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946), 110-11. Where the original Danish words 
and phrases from this text are cited, these can be found in Søren Kierkegaard, 
Kjerlighedens Gjerninger: nogle christelige Overveielser i Talers Form (C.A. Reitzel, 1862). 
See also Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter (SKS).
 Ibid., 112. Throughout Works of Love, Kierkegaard often speaks of “the eternal” in a way  2
which implies its synonymity with God’s love. Notably, in his opening “Prayer” to Works of 
Love, Kierkegaard addresses God as “Eternal Love.” See Ibid., 4. For a more detailed 
examination of this point, see also Andrew Burgess, “Kierkegaard’s Concept of Redoubling 
and Luther’s Simul Justus,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary 16: Works of Love, 
ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999), 39–55.
 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 112–13.3
 David R Law, “Cheap Grace and the Cost of Discipleship in Kierkegaard’s For Self-4
Examination,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary 21: For Self-Examination and Judge 
for Yourself, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002), 111–42. For 
the classical formulation of this charge against Kierkegaard’s ethic, see Theodor W. Adorno, 
“On Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love,” Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 8 (1939): 
413–29.
 M. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love 5
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 56.
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Ferreira points towards the formal structure of IIA-IIC in WOL. Whereas IIB focuses 
on the object of Christian love — the “neighbor” — and maintains that no one can 
be excluded, IIC (“Thou shalt love”) focuses upon the subject of love’s duty and 
argues that no one can exclude themselves from the obligation.  
Taken together, Ferreira argues that the three chapters which comprise the 
second deliberation of WOL (IIA, IIB and IIC) “provide a formal account of the 
unconditionality of the commandment.”  Seen in this context, the temporal 6
conditions which Kierkegaard instructs his reader to ignore are those which “blind 
us to our kinship” and thereby undermine the command to love one’s neighbor.  7
Turning to the example of the charwoman in “IIIB: Love is a Matter of Conscience,” 
Ferreira argues that Kierkegaard addresses this hypothetical figure in her particular 
circumstances, in order to illustrate that even the poorest person is equal to the 
richest in her capacity to love the neighbor. Ferreira thus paraphrases Kierkegaard’s 
advice in IIIB: “do not think that changing such external distinctions can make it 
easier for you to fulfil your obligations of love... as if it would be easier to be a 
better Christian if one were also a ‘Madame.’”  Kierkegaard’s central point here, for 8
Ferreira, is not to deny the importance of socio-economic conditions per se, but 
rather to affirm that all human beings, irrespective of their temporal situation, are 
equal in their capacity to obey the commandment to love and follow their 
consciences “before God.” 
The contention of this paper is that Ferreira too easily dismisses the extent to 
which Kierkegaard’s thought seems to advocate disregarding temporal matters in 
favour of focusing upon the eternal. As has been pointed out, one should not expect 
a mid-19th century thinker such as Kierkegaard to advocate a paternalistic social or 
economic program.  Nevertheless, Kierkegaard’s steadfast rejection of worldly cares 9
remains striking. It is not simply that Kierkegaard’s comments risk legitimizing a 
 M. Jamie Ferreira, “Equality, Impartiality, and Moral Blindness in Kierkegaard’s ‘Works of 6
Love’,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 25.1 (1997): 74.
 Ibid., 76.7
 Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, 96.8
 Margaret Daphne Hampson, Kierkegaard: Exposition and Critique (Oxford: Oxford 9
University Press, 2013), 212.
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conformist attitude towards the status quo.  As this paper will aim to elaborate 10
further, seen through the lens of Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing (POH)  and 11
Kierkegaard’s Discourses, Kierkegaard can be seen to advocate a dismissal of 
temporal goods altogether.  
The Commandment to Love thy Neighbor in IIA, IIB and IIC of 
Works of Love  
One point at which Ferreira’s reading may be instructively challenged is in her 
reading of IIA-C in the first series of WOL. As outlined above, Ferreira regards these 
deliberations as structured to collectively give an account of Christian love’s 
unconditionality. Within this framework, IIA posits the imperative-form of the 
command (“shalt”), IIB that its object (the “neighbor”) is everyone, and IIC that no 
ethical subject (“thou”) can exclude themselves from its remit. In what follows, I 
will argue that, particularly when viewed together with Kierkegaard’s other writings, 
this is not where the pressure of the text lies. Rather, Kierkegaard’s unrelenting 
emphasis in these discourses is on the divine imperative. While it is true that 
Kierkegaard reads the commandment as mandating that every human being love all 
others, the overriding theme of these discourses is that the individual is subject to 
a divine command, to which he must respond immediately with the whole of his 
being. 
IIA and IIB: The Commandment  
This point can be illuminated by looking to Kierkegaard’s treatment of the 
Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10) in WOL. This parable has often been 
discussed by commentators as if its primary message was the universality of the 
neighbor and his identity as anyone in need of help. Perhaps in greater faithfulness 
to the text, however, this is not how Kierkegaard reads the parable.  
 Sylvia Walsh, “Other-Worldliness in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love — A Response,” 10
Philosophical Investigations 22. 1 (1999): 83.
 Although cited in its separately published form here, Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing, 11
also titled “An Occasional Discourse,” was written as the first part of Upbuilding Discourses 
in Various Spirits (1847).
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Kierkegaard first references the Good Samaritan in “IIA: Thou Shalt Love Thy 
Neighbor.” In answering the question of “who is my neighbor?,” Kierkegaard writes 
that Christ directs his questioner’s attention to the subject of mercy, rather than its 
object. “Christ does not talk about knowing one’s neighbor, but about oneself being 
a neighbor.”  The neighbor, for Kierkegaard, is one who recognizes that he has a 12
duty to love. It is the active dutifulness of love, seen in Christ’s closing words to his 
questioner in Luke 10 of “[g]o and do likewise,” which for Kierkegaard provides the 
key to understanding not just this parable, but the whole of Christianity. Christ’s 
answer, Kierkegaard writes, may be regarded as implicitly etched “by the side of 
every word” in the Bible.  Kierkegaard’s message here is one to which he returns 13
repeatedly in WOL and elsewhere: Christians must not be preoccupied with self-
interested thoughts or concerns, but must instead adhere to God’s will without 
delay. 
Against the “double-mindedness” of thinking that Christianity advocates both 
commanded neighbor-love and natural love, Kierkegaard insists that true 
Christianity thinks only of the former.  The correct pattern of Christian praxis is to 14
direct one’s attention to God in prayer, after which “the first [person] you meet is 
your neighbor whom you must love.”  The category of “neighbor” here is a function 15
of the divine imperative; the true object of Christian love remains God.  For 16
Kierkegaard, all earthly love and friendship is self-love, love for “the other I” which 
effectively amounts to “self-worship.”  The object of love is therefore either one’s 17
self (earthly love) or God (Christianity). In neither is the object the human “other.” 
Put another way, the central message of IIB is not that the object of divinely-
commanded love is every human being (although Kierkegaard does affirm this), but 
that earthly love and friendship are dethroned by the divine imperative (“shalt”). 
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IIC: The Individual Subject of the Commandment  
The ethical subject, or human “thou,” of IIC’s title is the single individual, “to 
whom eternity unceasingly speaks” to give the imperative to love his neighbor.  In 18
yet another echo of Christ’s closing words in Luke 10 of “[g]o and do likewise,” IIC 
begins by reaffirming the urgency of the imperative: “So then go out and practice 
it.”  In order to do this, Kierkegaard encourages the ethical subject to close his 19
eyes and “become merely an ear for hearing the word of the commandment.”  20
When eternity is the object of one’s attention in this way, all temporal demarcations 
become irrelevant. That which is loved about the other is the presence of the 
eternal itself, which Kierkegaard likens to a “watermark” in all human beings.  In 21
attending only to the eternal and its command to love the eternal, the ethical 
subject therefore adopts an attitude of disregard towards temporal features. 
Only by loving one’s neighbor as oneself can one “accomplish the highest,” 
which is to serve the will of God as an “instrument in the hand of Providence 
[Redskab i Styrelsens Haand].”  Kierkegaard’s logic in IIA-IIC may therefore be 22
said to follow the overall structure of Matthew 22:34-41, where the command to 
“love thy neighbor as thyself” is preceded by the imperative to unreservedly love 
and obey God “with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind.”  23
Indeed, Kierkegaard notably orders the focuses of each first-series discourse in 
WOL according to the ordering of objects in Matthew 22:34–41: God (the “shalt” of 
IIA), others (“neighbor” in IIB), self (the “thou” of IIC). The reason for this, I 




 Ibid., 71; see also Ibid., 226.22
 See Ibid., 17. This also aligns with Luke 10, where the same injunction to neighbor-love is 23
stated, directly prior to the Parable of the Good Samaritan, in the form of a single 
commandment with two clauses: “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and 
with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbor as 
yourself” (Luke 10:27). 
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submit, is that for Kierkegaard all Christian love results from, and is directed 
towards, serving the will of the eternal/God.   24
It is with this context in mind, I argue, that one is best able to understand 
the contours of what follows in Kierkegaard’s third discourse (IIIA and IIIB) of WOL.  
Another look at IIIA and IIIB: Busyness, Distraction and 
Double-Mindedness  
Kierkegaard begins “IIIA: Love is the Fulfilment of the Law” with the story of the 
“man who had two sons” in Matthew 21. One son promises to do his father’s will, 
but does not, while the other does not make this promise and yet acts. Drawing 
again on Christ’s answer to the question of “who is my neighbor?” in Luke 10, 
Kierkegaard seeks to elucidate how the Christian, akin to the dutiful son in Matthew 
21, acts immediately in order to fulfil the imperative to love one’s neighbor.  25
Rather than examining the parameters of who should be loved, Christ’s answer in 
the form of an imperative (“go and do likewise”) cuts short the conversation and 
demands an ethical response.  As Kierkegaard sees it, Christ is here concerned 26
with neither the object nor the subject of Christian love, but rather with its form as 
an imperative from God.  
In Kierkegaard’s view, worldliness and busyness have become “inseparable 
ideas.”  Whether or not human beings are busy depends not on how they do 27
things, but upon the object of their attention. If their object is the “manifold” of 
temporal matters, then they will be “divided and distracted” in their efforts and 
therefore “busy.”  If, however, a person’s love is focused entirely on the eternal, 28
“undividedly present in every utterance” and “perpetually active,” this is not 
 For an account of how this conviction continues to underpin Kierkegaard’s ethic in Works 24
of Love’s second series of discourses, see G. P. Marcar, “The Divine Relationship Ethics of 
Kierkegaard’s Love-Sleuth in Works of Love.” Studies in Christian Ethics, 32.3 (2019): 
341-51.
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busyness.  The problem of busyness, distraction and double-mindedness is also 29
the subject of Chapter 7 of POH, which was published in the same year as WOL. 
Here, Kierkegaard’s aim is to focus on the most common form of double-
mindedness which prevents the individual from pursuing the Good in truth: 
commitment to the Good which is only “to a certain degree.”  Busyness, for 30
Kierkegaard, lies within double-mindedness, just as “stillness dwells in the 
desert.”  Kierkegaard gives a hypothetical with clear parallels to the biblical parable 31
with which he begins IIIA:  
Suppose that there were two men: a doubleminded man, who believes 
he has gained faith in a loving Providence, because he had himself 
experienced having been helped, even though he had hardheartedly 
sent away a sufferer whom he could have helped; and another man 
whose life, by devoted love, was an instrument in the hand of 
Providence [Redskab i Forsynets Haand], so that he helped many 
suffering ones, although the help he himself had wished continued to 
be denied him.  32
Just as the brother in Matthew 21 who said “yes” to God did not keep his promise, 
so too the “double-minded” man in POH, Chapter 7 believed in loving divine 
providence and yet did not follow that divine will in relation to others. This contrasts 
with the brother who said “no” in Matthew 21 but nevertheless did God’s will, and 
the abovementioned man whose personal belief (or lack thereof) is not mentioned 
by Kierkegaard, but who was in any case a single-minded “instrument in the hand” 
of divine providence. In both IIIA of WOL and POH, Kierkegaard wishes to contrast 
the mentality of “busyness” and “double-mindedness,” in which a person may claim 
to obey God but does not, with a mentality of single-minded obedience to God’s 
providential will.  
 Ibid., 80–81.29
 Søren Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing; Spiritual Preparation for the 30





Unlike either of the brothers in Matthew 21, Christ was not divided in 
answering his Father, and did not delay. The love of Christ, Kierkegaard writes, was 
“perpetually active,” without a single moment when it was “merely a passive 
feeling.”  Kierkegaard describes how Christ’s life was therefore akin to a “single 33
working day.”  This presented a “terrible collision” with the purely human 34
conception of love.  Christ was misunderstood by all who encountered him, 35
including his closest disciples. Commenting upon Christ saying to Peter “get behind 
me Satan,” Kierkegaard remarks that this occurred because Peter (in his 
misunderstanding) wanted Christ to subscribe to the human conception of love.   36
Kierkegaard goes on to claim that God is not simply a “third party” or “middle 
term” to love, but its “sole object,” such that “it is not the husband who is the wife’s 
beloved, but it is God.”  That Kierkegaard illustrates his point with among the most 37
exclusive of human relationships (the bond between marriage partners) arguably 
highlights his intention to leave no room for ambiguity or dilution. Within 
Kierkegaard’s framework, all human love has God as its focus and endpoint: “to be 
loved is to be helped to love God.”  Ferreira interprets this as simply meaning that 38
an individual’s own judgements must be sublimated to those of God. “[W]hat is at 
stake in this idea is that God should remain the judge of what true love is.”  This 39
reading, however, does not go far enough. As noted above, a thematic thread runs 
through the preceding content of WOL which stresses that being a Christian lover 
means acting according to the imperative-form of the commandment to love one’s 
neighbor: “Go and do likewise” (IIA, IIB, IIC, IIIA). The imperative flows from a 
prior attentiveness towards the eternal/God (IIB) and stands opposed to any 
distracted, busy, double-mindedness which would prevent the individual from 






 Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, 71.39
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becoming a wholly committed instrument of divine providence (IIC; POH). Once 
this background context is taken into account, it is clear that, as John Lippitt 
observes, in stating that God is the “sole object” of love, Kierkegaard “certainly 
seems to be saying something stronger” than Ferreira allows.   40
“IIIB: Love is a Matter of Conscience” continues this emphasis. Christianity 
renders every human relationship a “matter of conscience” between the individual 
and God.  As noted earlier, Kierkegaard here states (with the example of the poor 41
working woman) that Christianity advises every individual not to busy themselves 
[travlt] with temporal matters. Reference to busyness occurs again when 
Kierkegaard comments that despite the fact that people have “foolishly busied 
[travlt] themselves” to demonstrate gender equality, such equality has never been 
Christianity’s concern.  Later in the discourse, Kierkegaard further comments that 42
“[t]he idea... that we should first busy ourselves [travlt] in finding the beloved... is 
very far from being Christian love.”  This stance against love which involves people 43
being “busy” is immediately reminiscent of IIIA.  
The conceptual and thematic affinity of IIIB with IIIA and POH becomes even 
clearer towards the end of this discourse, when Kierkegaard states that conscience 
requires a “pure heart.”  Such a heart is “bound” to God, whose demands 44
consequently take absolute priority for the individual in all situations. Those in this 
relation of conscience are thus entirely “before God,” such that the “confidence of 
eternity” stands between them and even their closest human relations.  The 45
 John Lippitt, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Self-Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University 40
Press, 2013), 67. For a critique which argues extensively for the prominence of this “anti-
social” element in Works of Love, see for instance Peter George, “Something Anti-Social 
About Works of Love,” in Kierkegaard: The Self in Society, ed. George Pattison and Steven 
Shakespeare (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 70–81.







individual’s normative reference point is thus changed from the realm of temporal 
goods and earthly connections, to that of eternity and one’s commitment to God.   46
Seen in this light, a much stronger stance against caring about social or 
economic conditions begins to emerge in Kierkegaard’s ethic. In order to better 
inform our interpretation of Kierkegaard in this area, it will be instructive to turn to 
his detailed critiques of caring about worldliness and temporal conditions in his 
Discourses. The centrality of Kierkegaard’s concern that God be pursued through a 
singularly focused, undivided will, as well as the interconnectedness of this concern 
with the motifs of busyness, distraction and comparison, is seen clearly in 
Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (UDVS) (1847), Devotional Discourses 
(1849) and Christian Discourses (CD) (1849). 
Kierkegaard’s Discourses and Other Writings 
Feathered and Stemmed Teachers: The Birds and the Lilies  
A common motif in Kierkegaard’s Discourses is the pedagogical value of the 
birds and the lilies cited by Christ during his teaching in Matthew 6. Kierkegaard 
refers to the birds and the lilies as “teachers,”  capable of exhibiting to humanity 47
how it should relate itself in undivided obedience to the will of God. The example of 
the birds and the lilies is an analogous and ultimately imperfect one, as Kierkegaard 
recognises. The ultimate and perfect exemplar for human attitudes towards 
themselves and others in relation to God (as will be explored below) is Christ 
himself, “the prototype.”  
“Before God” 
Kierkegaard describes how the birds and the lilies exist wholly “before God.” 
In order to achieve and remain in this state, human beings must avoid comparison, 
 In positing that an undistracted focus on the eternal/God entails a rejection of temporal 46
goods, Kierkegaard is, of course, saying no more than many of the Church Fathers who 
preceded him. See perhaps especially Maximus the Confessor, “The Four Hundred Chapters 
on Love,” in Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings, trans. George C. Berthold (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1985), 33–98.
 Søren Kierkegaard, Without Authority, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 47
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 10.
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busyness and worry. The interconnectedness of these practices is made explicit in 
“To be Contented with Being a Human Being” in UDVS. In this discourse, 
Kierkegaard bemoans how during one’s daily associations with others, “one forgets 
through the busy [travle] or the worried [bekymrede] inventiveness of comparison 
[Sammenlignings] what it is to be a human being.”  Kierkegaard then sets out to 48
illustrate the deleterious effects of comparison through two stories. In the first 
story, the “worried [bekymrede] lily,” a lily residing amongst small flowers is 
seduced by a visiting bird, who over time makes the lily envious by telling it about 
the beauty of other lilies and the splendour of the “Crown Imperial.”  As a result, 49
the lily becomes unhappy with its place in the world, and eventually asks the bird to 
transport it to the other lilies and plant it in this richer environment. After the bird 
uproots the lily and carries it into the air, however, the lily perishes.  
From this unhappy ending, Kierkegaard exhorts that “[a]ll worldly worry has 
its basis in a person’s unwillingness to be contented with being a human being, in 
his worried craving for distinction by way of comparison.”  Kierkegaard’s second 50
story further illustrates this point. In “the bird’s worry” (Fuglens Bekymring), a wild 
wood-dove is told by a tame-dove and its partner of how they are looked after by a 
farmer who keeps an abundance of grain inside a barn.  After comparing its 51
situation unfavourably to the apparent certainty and security enjoyed by the tame-
doves, the wood-dove becomes “so busy [saa travlt] gleaning and hoarding that it 
scarcely had time... to eat its fill.”  Although the wood-dove has enough to survive, 52
“it had acquired an idea of need in the future. It had lost its peace of mind — it had 
acquired worry.”  Kierkegaard makes it clear that it is not any material lack per se 53
 Søren Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. and trans. Howard V. 48
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 165. Where the 
original Danish words and phrases are cited from this text and Purity of Heart Is to Will One 
Thing, these can be found in Søren Kierkegaard, Opbyggelige taler i forskjellig aand 
(Reitzels forlag, 1862). See also SKS. 







which prevents the creature from contentedly living “before God,” but the mind-set 
which compares oneself with others, busily attempts to change one’s situation, and 
worries about future prosperity.  
As a result of its worrying and busyness, the wood-dove became physically 
and mentally diminished: “Its feathers lost their iridescence; its flight lost its 
buoyancy. Its day was passed in a fruitless attempt to accumulate abundance... It 
was no longer joyful.”  Driven by its envy of the wealthy doves, the wood-dove 54
eventually contrives to sneak into the barn where the grain is kept. When, however, 
the farmer sees the bird, he places it in a box and kills it.  The wood-dove’s 55
original error, for Kierkegaard, was being discontented with what it was. To be 
contented as a human being is to live in recognition of one’s dependency upon God, 
realizing that (irrespective of economic or social status) one can ultimately “no 
more support himself than create himself.”  Only with this understanding, 56
Kierkegaard claims, can anyone be truly content as a human being. 
This normative anthropology occurs again in Kierkegaard’s “The Care of 
Lowliness” in CD. Unlike the carefree birds of Matthew 6, the “lowly Christian” is 
consciously aware of his socio-economic status in relation to others. Unlike the 
pagan, however, Kierkegaard writes that the Christian does not define himself 
according to his comparative status or desire to ascend the socio-economic ladder 
and be “something” in relation to others.  Instead, the Christian is wholly 57
contented with being “himself before God.”  In this way, Kierkegaard makes clear 58
that the person should not care about their social or economic standing before 




 Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses: The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, 57
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Service and Obedience to the Divine Will 
Existing “before God” without comparison, busyness or worry, the birds and 
the lilies are able to unconditionally seek God’s kingdom, in absolute obedience to 
their Creator. The bird does not demand to have anything for itself, or to be 
anything by itself. This, according to Kierkegaard, is its “perfection.”  Commenting 59
on the injunctions in Matthew 6:33 to not worry and “seek first” God’s kingdom, 
Kierkegaard similarly describes how the bird does not “seek” anything for itself 
during even the longest of migrations.  All of the bird’s actions are done as 60
imperatives from God. Its will being extensions of God’s will, the bird and the lily 
accept their temporal circumstances as they are, even if these appear 
disadvantageous to the organism. The kingdom of God must be unconditionally 
sought from where one is, as to try and begin elsewhere is prima facie not to seek 
God’s kingdom “first.”  Applied to human beings in their various social and 61
economic circumstances, this would seem to imply that one should not aspire to a 
higher socio-economic status, as such an aspiration is contrary to unconditionally 
seeking God’s will.  
In the second of his Devotional Discourses on the birds and the lilies (1849), 
Kierkegaard focuses on the statement that “no one can serve two 
masters” (Matthew 6:24). As the creator and sustainer of every person’s existence, 
God is “infinitely closer” to a person than anyone else could be.  Consequently, 62
indifference towards God is impossible. One either loves God, or hates Him. Due to 
the relation being one of creature to Creator, love takes the form of unconditional 
obedience. The implication of this for one’s attitude towards temporal goods is 
dramatic and uncompromising. Either God is served, or mammon. To believe that 
one can have “a little mammon” to oneself (for instance, a “single penny”) is to be 
decisively not serving God.   63
 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 205.59
 Ibid., 208–9.60
 Ibid., 211.61
 Kierkegaard, Without Authority, 23.62
 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 207.63
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Humanity’s Difference  
The bird and the lily, as with all of nature for Kierkegaard, exist in a state of 
“unconditional obedience” to God.  There is no double-mindedness in the bird; 64
God’s will simply is its will,  and its obedience is therefore never only “to a certain 65
degree.” In this way, the birds and the lilies in Matthew 6 analogously exemplify 
how human beings ought to exist wholly “before God” in absolute obedience to His 
will. However, as alluded to above, the bird and the lily remain imperfect teachers 
for the human pupil.  
In contrast to non-human animals (which only exist as part of a collective or 
“crowd”), each human being is a distinct individual.  Moreover, unlike the bird and 66
the lily, who possess only one will (God’s) and are unalterably “bound in 
necessity,”  the human person has an autonomous will which must be sacrificed, 67
freedom with which to make this determination,  and consciousness of what it 68
lacks or will need in the future.  In addition, humanity’s most profound difference 69
is its capacity to worship God. Human beings are capable of this because, as 
created in the image of God, they harbour an internal, invisible glory which the bird 
and the lily lack.  In becoming as nothing in absolute dependence on God, human 70
beings inversely “image” their Creator and thereby “resemble” Him.  This is 71
paradigmatically exemplified for Kierkegaard by Jesus Christ, “the prototype” who, 
 Kierkegaard, Without Authority, 25–26.64
 Ibid., 26.65





 Ibid., 192-93. See also Kierkegaard’s 1844 discourse, “One Who Prays Aright Struggles in 71
Prayer and Is Victorious — in That God Is Victorious”: “God can imprint himself in [a person] 
only when he himself has become nothing. When the ocean is exerting all its power, that is 
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nothingness.” In Søren Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. and trans. Howard 
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as the fullest instantiation of what it is to be a human being, could teach humanity 
in a way that the birds and the lilies (which he pointed to out of humility) could not. 
In this sense, the Christian is not simply “before God” in the same sense as 
the bird and the lily, but also “before his prototype” who is at once fully God and 
fully human. “As a human being he was created in God’s image [Billede], but as a 
Christian he has God as the prototype [Forbillede].”  Although a person may 72
therefore start with the example set by the bird and the lily so as to ascertain what 
it means to be “before God” and undividedly obey His will, this cannot be where the 
lesson stops. “The lowly Christian, who before God is himself, exists as a Christian 
before his prototype.”  As seen earlier, Kierkegaard in IIIA of WOL presents Christ 73
as the exemplar par excellence of a love which was “perpetually active” in service 
to the divine imperative, causing a “terrible collision” with the world’s 
understanding. Only by looking at the example of Christ can one appreciate the full 
picture of how the Christian, for Kierkegaard, should relate to the temporal world 
around him. 
Christ’s Prototypical Lowliness in Human Obedience to God  
In UDVS, Kierkegaard describes how, through enduring the “heaviest 
suffering” of any human being, Christ “learned obedience” to God.  This is aptly 74
demonstrated for Kierkegaard in Christ praying to the Father in the garden of 
Gethsemane that the cup be taken from him, but not “if it be your will.” The first 
part of obedience is the discernment of God’s will; the second part is the fulfilment 
of that will.  In Practice in Christianity (PC), Anti-Climacus parses this matter in 75
terms of Christ’s “task” (opgave) of obedience to God. Christ manifested this task 
externally through his lowliness, which lasted the duration of his entire life and 
 Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 41 (emphasis original).72
 Ibid., 42 (emphasis original).73




culminated in his death on the cross.  Christ qua human being understood this and 76
regarded his entire life as a test in obedience, with God as the examiner. Indeed, 
Anti-Climacus suggests that Christ’s exaltation after death can be viewed as a result 
of him passing this test “at every moment” of his life. It is at this point that he is 
the “prototype” whose life guides others in passing the same test.  Passing the test 77
of obedience to God, as shown in the lifespan of Christ, involves abasement and 
lowliness. 
In Judge for Yourselves! Kierkegaard posits Christ as the sole example of one 
who served only one master. As a result of this, Christ could not be tolerated by 
humanity which, to varying degrees, always serves more than one master. Christ’s 
single-mindedness is shown in the entire “pattern” of his life, in which he had no 
family connections, belonged to no country, took no property, and married no 
spouse.  Christ embraces poverty and lowliness, living “without a nest, without a 78
hole... whereon to lay His head.”  As such, Christ is “an alien in the world,” whose 79
entire existence is deliberately orientated towards serving only one master.  This 80
necessitated a complete rejection of all temporal goods and worldly status. To be a 
 Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 76
Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 182. See also Kierkegaard, For Self-
Examination; And, Judge for Yourselves; And, Three Discourses 1851, trans. Walter Lowrie 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944), 80–81.
 Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 183–84.77
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disciple of Christ is to relate to him through his connection with God.  The world 81
insists on compromise; Christianity demands an unambiguous and “absolute” 
choice of either/or in its injunction that one “cannot serve two masters.” 
In CD, Kierkegaard cites two reasons why it is more difficult for an eminent 
person (in the worldly sense) to be or become a Christian, while it is conversely 
easier for the lowly. Firstly, although the lowliness which is constitutive of being a 
Christian is primarily spiritual and internal in nature, biblical scriptures show a clear 
normative preference for being literally (i.e. physically and externally) lowly.  A 82
faithful following of these scriptures should take this emphasis into account. 
Secondly (and more pertinently for Kierkegaard), “the prototype” for Christian 
living was literally lowly.  This, for the Christian, entails that being a lowly person 83
has the potential (actualised in the life of Christ) to mean “infinitely much.”  84
Kierkegaard thus writes that in being lowly, and yet “forgetting” their socio-
economic state before others, the Christian “looks more or less like the 
prototype.”   85
The Offensive Love of God in Christ  
In Works of Love’s first discourse, Kierkegaard makes clear that all Christian 
love has the love of God as its source: “[a]s the peaceful lake is grounded deep in 
the hidden spring which no eye can see, so a man’s love is grounded even deeper in 
the love of God.”  In order to fully appreciate the Christo-centric character of 86
Kierkegaard’s ethic, however, one must begin even further back at Works of Love’s 
 Ibid., 181.81
 Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 54.82
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opening prayer, in which Kierkegaard states that love is known through God’s prior 
initiative of love towards humanity God “didst hold nothing back but didst give 
everything in love” and “made manifest what love is” in being humanity’s redeemer, 
giving himself to “save us all.”  Kierkegaard proceeds to call on the Holy Spirit, or 87
“Spirit of Love,” to “remind the believer to love as he is loved, and his neighbor as 
himself.”  The juxtaposition of biblical verses here is highly instructive. The first 88
clause (“love as he is loved”) alludes to John 13:34 or John 15:9-12, where Christ 
— prior to or after telling his disciples that he is the sole “way” to God the Father 
and the Holy Spirit will remind them of his teaching (John 14) — newly commands 
that his disciples “love one another as I have loved you.” In placing this imperative 
as the antecedent to the commandment that one should love one’s neighbor as 
oneself (Matthew 22:37; Luke 10:27), Kierkegaard’s prayer appears to treat the 
first commandment or imperative in Matthew 22 and Luke 10 — “love the Lord your 
God with all your heart” — as substitutable with Christ’s instruction that his 
disciples should love as he, the self-revelation of God, has already acted towards 
them.  
This, I suggest, provides a new angle on the current discussion. By beginning 
Works of Love with his prayerful and Christo-centric affirmation of divine love, 
Kierkegaard places all discussion about love in the context of God’s prior 
soteriological initiative towards humanity in becoming incarnate as “humanity’s 
redeemer”: Jesus Christ. To apply this lens to our current discussion, while 
Kierkegaard’s Discourses and WOL may jointly detail what it means to love God as 
a creature through doxological obedience to His will and becoming “an instrument 
in the hand of Providence,” one’s interpretation of this divine will must be 
conditioned by considering the form of God’s antecedent outreach of love towards 
the believer in Christ; “love as he [already has been] loved.” The nature and 
implications of this outreach is not discussed explicitly by Kierkegaard under his 
own name, but by his pseudonyms, Climacus and Anti-Climacus. 
 Ibid., 4.87
 Ibid., For Ferreira’s commentary on this point, see Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, 18.88
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“The wonder” of God’s Love in Philosophical Fragments and The Sickness 
Unto Death 
In Chapter 2 of Philosophical Fragments (PF), Johannes Climacus embarks on 
a “poetic venture” which tells of “a king who loved a maiden.” This is intended to 
explore how and why “the Teacher” or “the god” might choose to reveal Himself to 
the learner. Climacus begins with an unequivocal affirmation that God’s motivation 
is love, and winning the learner’s love is His end.  Love for Climacus entails a 89
desire for absolute equality with the beloved. Consequently, God’s self-revelation to 
the learner in the form of a humble “servant” is not a guise, but his “true form.”  90
For Climacus, that God in love seeks absolute equality with the learner is simply too 
incredible for human comprehension. He explains: 
it is indeed less terrifying to fall upon one’s face while the mountains 
tremble at the god’s voice than to sit with him as his equal... for if the 
god gave no indication, how could it occur to a man that the blessed 
god could need him? This would indeed be... so bad a thought that it 
could not arise in him, even though, when the god has confided it to 
him, he adoringly says: This thought did not arise in my heart... for do 
we not... stand here before the wonder [Vidunderet].  91
Climacus’ acknowledgment here that “the wonder” of God’s loving initiative towards 
the learner “did not arise in [a human] heart” references 1 Corinthians 2:9, the full 
text of which reads “[w]hat no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man 
imagined, what God has prepared for those who love him.”  The “paradox” 92
becomes “absolute,” Climacus goes on to claim, in two respects: Firstly, that 
“absolute equality” is sought with the learner, and secondly that this learner is 
 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments; Johannes Climacus, ed. and trans. Howard 89
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 25.
 Ibid., 32.90
 Ibid., 34–36.91
 See also “Strengthening in the Inner Being” (1843), where Kierkegaard affirms that 92
“God’s love...is more blessed than anything which arose in the human heart” Kierkegaard, 
Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 97.
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resultantly revealed to be in a state of untruth (i.e. sin).  The first aspect (that 93
absolute equality is sought with the learner) is the crux of Climacus’ “poetic 
venture.”  As C. Stephen Evans notes in his commentary on PF, the Incarnation as 94
presented by Climacus’ parable of the king and the maiden “represents the epitome 
of pure, selfless love” which is nowhere encountered in human experience and 
therefore presents a decisive and threatening challenge to human self-
understanding.   95
Through his parable of the “poor day laborer and the mightiest emperor” in 
Sickness Unto Death (SUD), Anti-Climacus similarly locates the offensiveness of 
Christianity in God’s selfless outreach towards humanity. One day, the emperor 
suddenly requests the day-laborer, “in whose heart” (Anti-Climacus remarks in a 
clear reference to 1 Corinthians 2:9), “it had never arisen” that the emperor even 
knew he existed.  The emperor reaches out to make the laborer an in-law. Such an 96
invitation is almost impossible for him to believe. “A little favor — that would make 
sense to the laborer... But this, this plan for him to become a son-in-law, well, that 
was far too much.”  Just as Climacus ends his parable of the king and the maiden 97
by professing that God’s initiative to be “the wonder” which did not originate in any 
human heart, so too Anti-Climacus concludes that the divine action his story 
portrays is “too high for me, I cannot grasp it.”   98
 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 47. 93
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While Climacus does not explore the reason for this incomprehension and 
awe, Anti-Climacus proceeds to offer a brief account. “The summa summarum of all 
human wisdom,” Anti-Climacus writes, is encapsulated by the saying that “too much 
and too little spoil everything.”  The principle which underlies this saying, “ne quid 99
nimis”  — nothing in excess — was inscribed, along with “know thyself,” at the 100
Delphic Oracle of Ancient Greece. The Christian narrative of God’s communicative 
love in the Incarnation decisively contravenes this human wisdom in its apparent 
excessiveness; it is simply “too high” for the self-orientated understanding of 
human beings. “The uncharitableness of the natural man cannot allow him the 
extraordinary that God has intended for him; so he is offended.”  In this way, 101
Anti-Climacus’ account in SUD can be seen to complement and expand upon that of 
Climacus in PF. Both ground their stories with a clear nod to 1 Corinthians 2:9 and 
its declaration that no human heart has ever “conceived” that which “God has 
prepared for those who love him.”  
Christ’s servant form, Climacus writes, “means only that he was a lowly 
human being,” indistinguishable from others.  Unlike all other human beings, 102
however, Christ in his servant form expresses that an absolute indifference (akin to 
the lilies and “birds of the air” of Matthew 6) to the distribution of earthly goods, 
“as one who owns nothing and wishes to own nothing.”  Instead, the entirety of 103
Christ’s focus is on seeking the love [Kjærlighed] of his disciples [Disciplens].  104
Provided that they remain “absorbed in the service of the spirit,” Climacus affirms 
that this way of existing within the world is possible for every human being, 










It might here be asked why Christ’s lowliness and disregard for temporal 
goods was constitutive of total selflessness. The answer to this may be found 
through a brief detour to CD, where Kierkegaard posits that all temporal goods are 
intrinsically selfish or “begrudging” [misundelig]. While an individual acquires, 
possesses or maintains such goods, his mind is not wholly attentive to the other.  106
By contrast, in assuming a state of absolute lowliness and poverty, Christ was able 
to constantly and entirely focus on others.  As the Prototype for all humanity, 107
nothing in Christ’s life was accidental. His way of living, which was “indeed the 
way,”  therefore reveals the “essential truth” that “in order to make others rich 108
one must oneself be poor.”  The consequences of this way of living within the 109
world are further explored by Anti-Climacus in PC. 
Christ’s Reckless Love, Poverty and Lowliness in Practice in Christianity  
Anti-Climacus begins the first part of PC by inquiring into why Christ’s 
contemporaries unanimously opposed him. This would not have been the case, 
Anti-Climacus argues, if he had conformed to the world’s conception of 
compassion.  Proceeding from the “fixed point” of oneself and the belief that 110
“everyone wants to cling to his own,” human compassion is anchored in selfishness; 
as such, it is only ever “to a certain degree,” and never “reckless.”  This contrasts 111
absolutely with the divine love revealed in Christ. Being “unconditionally” concerned 
with all others and without any self-regard, Christ’s love manifested as “unlimited 
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recklessness” to humanity.  This alone, Anti-Climacus comments, would have 112
been “sufficient for [Christ] to come to grief in the world.”   113
Anti-Climacus goes on to further describe how a constant outcome of Christ’s 
self-giving modus operandi was others’ failure to understand him. This is 
exemplified by the Pharisees’ presentation of Christ with a coin, accompanied by 
the question of whether taxes should be paid to Caesar (Matthew 22:15-22). Anti-
Climacus writes that through his answer (“Render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s”), Christ expresses “infinite 
indifference” towards the very premise of the question, as to do otherwise would 
detract from giving obedience to God, and selfless love to humanity.  In the lowly 114
life of the prototype, these orientations towards God and humanity are shown to be 
co-extensive parts of the same whole which, out of relational selflessness, entails 
“infinite indifference” towards temporal matters.  
Conclusion  
While Ferreira rightly identifies Kierkegaard’s focus in WOL as the ethical subject of 
love, she downplays the significance of Kierkegaard’s insistence that God is love’s 
“sole object.” As outlined above, behind Kierkegaard’s claim as to what Christianity 
advises in IIIB of WOL are motifs of comparison, busyness and double-mindedness 
which are also present in preceding discourses IIA-C and IIIA. To will only one 
thing, for Kierkegaard, is to have absolute attentiveness, commitment and love 
towards the Good (POH)/God (WOL and Discourses). The individual’s commitment 
will either adhere to this absolute standard, or be only “to a certain degree.” This 
insistence on sola Dei, I submit, may be an instructive hermeneutical lens through 
which to view Kierkegaard’s advice to the charwoman not to “busy herself” with 
trying to achieve a higher socio-economic status.  
 Ibid., 58; A similar point is made by Kierkegaard in UDVS. Human wisdom, he there 112
affirms, states that “everyone is closest to himself.” From this standpoint, “Christ’s life was 
foolish, since... it seemed as if he were closest to everyone else but the furthest from 
himself.” Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 232.




For Kierkegaard, not only does social and economic lowliness not exclude one 
from the obligation to practice Christian love, but it is normatively conducive to this 
end. An attitude of disregard towards temporal matters is not an accidental quality 
of faithful Christians; rather, it is essential to having an undivided will in service to, 
and “before,” God. The paradigmatic expression of this is Christ, “the prototype,” in 
whom a dismissal and rejection of temporal goods is made normative. In his human 
nature, Christ is the definitive prototype for how human beings should unreservedly 
conform themselves to the divine will. As God, Christ also reveals that this divine 
will seeks absolute equality with all others in selfless love. In light of this 
Christological framework and normative theological anthropology, Kierkegaard’s 
advice to the charwoman in IIIB of Works of Love might thus be paraphrased: “do 
not engage in busy double-mindedness, comparing yourself with others and self-
centeredly striving for temporal status. Instead, imitate the prototype, whose 
undivided will was always perpetually active in selfless service to God and love for 
others.” Kierkegaard’s ethical vision of the individual “before God” here is, in fact, 
more problematic than is often asserted. 
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